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Beyond narrative
)e shape of traumatic testimony
Molly Andrews
University of East London, UK
)is chapter will explore the limits and possibilities of narratives in which indi-
viduals turn to language to communicate the inexpressibility of experiences they 
have endured. )e central dilemma for many survivors of trauma is that they 
must tell their stories, and yet their stories cannot be told. Traumatic experiences 
o*en defy understanding; testimony of those who have survived can be marked 
by what is not there: coherence, structure, meaning, comprehensibility. )e 
actual emplotment of trauma testimony into conventional narrative con+gura-
tions — contained in time- transforms them into something which they are not: 
experiences which are endowed with a particular wholeness, which occurred in 
the past, and which have now ended. )e paper concludes with a discussion of 
the relationship between language and silence in traumatic testimony.
Abraham Lewin’s diary, posthumously published as Cups of Tears, documents daily 
life in the Warsaw Ghetto. In these pages, he re,ects on both the impossibility and 
the necessity of expressing his thoughts and feelings. For instance, he describes the 
day his wife, along with many others, was taken away to Treblinka: “Eclipse of the 
sun, universal blackness. My Luba was taken away.” He is a committed diarist who, 
nonetheless, doubts what is to be gained by capturing in words the horror which 
surrounds him.
But perhaps because the disaster is so great there is nothing to be gained by ex-
pressing in words everything that we feel. Only if we were capable of tearing out 
by the force of our pent-up anguish the greatest of all mountains, a Mount Everest, 
and with all our hatred and strength hurling it down on the heads of the German 
murderers of our young and old — this would be the only +tting reaction on our 
part. Words are beyond us now.
 Our hearts are empty and made of stone.
 (Cited in Wieviorka, 1994, pp. 24–25).
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Commenting on this passage, Annette Wieviorka writes: “)e victims are cer-
tainly beyond words, and yet, dispossessed of everything, words are all they have 
le*. Words which will be the sole trace of an existence conceived not as that of an 
individual but as that of a people.” (Wierviorka, 1994, p. 25). )is article concerns 
itself generally with trauma testimony and the narrative challenges it poses, as 
individuals like Lewin turn to language to communicate the inexpressibility of 
experiences they have endured. However, it is important to note that each trauma 
— while sharing some characteristics with other trauma events — is unique, both 
in terms of the ways in which individuals experience them, but also, critically, as 
historical events. In using examples from the Holocaust, South Africa, the Nax-
albari movement in Bengal, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in this paper, I wish to 
highlight certain features of traumatic testimonies, while at the same time respect-
ing the important di-erences between these ‘limit events.’
Geo-rey Hartman speaks of the injunction felt by many survivors of trauma, 
sometimes following decades of silence: “)ou shalt tell.” (1996, p. 13). But tell what, 
and to whom? Who, who was not there, will understand that ultimately the experi-
ences defy understanding? Despite their deep and lingering anguish, many survi-
vors of trauma do feel compelled to tell their stories, not because they believe that in 
so doing they will experience relief, but rather because not to do so is to betray those 
who cannot do so. )eir words testify to the very existence of a people. In Elie Wie-
sel’s words: “If someone else could have written my stories, I would not have written 
them. I have written them in order to testify. My role is the role of the witness. Not to 
tell, or to tell another story, is… to commit perjury.” (quoted in Felman, 1994, p. 90).
)e central dilemma for many survivors of trauma is that they must tell their 
stories, and yet their stories cannot be told. )e experiences which they have en-
dured defy understanding; the very act of rendering them into narrative form 
lends them a coherence which they do not have. Isak Dinesen is quoted as saying 
that any burden is bearable if it can be put into a story; but perhaps the psychologi-
cal reality is more complicated this. For some survivors of trauma, transforming 
an event which is wholly absent of meaning into a story form might be to lose ‘the 
force of its a-ront to understanding’ (Caruth, cited in Edkins, 2003, p. 41).
In this article, I will argue that o*entimes survivors of trauma articulate their 
experiences in ways in which we who are ‘outside’ are unable to accept, and so we 
begin a project to redeem the stories which we are told. )is reshaping of blank 
spaces is carried out in a number of ways, which I will crudely outline here. )e 
journey of redemption begins even before the transmission of the story, when we 
tell ourselves that the process of telling will itself be a healing one — a journey from 
su-ering to recovery. We encourage a traditional emplotment — what happened 
where, and when, to whom, and what followed a*er this — and even when this is 
not o-ered, we reorganise what we have heard to +t such a mould. We regard those 
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who tell us their stories as somehow special, o*en over-identifying with them (and 
thus appropriating their subject position as our own), while at the same time pre-
senting them as heroes. We are prone to over-interpret both what we are told and 
what we are not told. And we refuse to accept that we can neither understand nor 
represent that which has been told to us; that in many ways the experiences them-
selves are not capable of being understood nor represented.
Healing: Personal pain and social su%ering
I have written elsewhere (Andrews, 2007) about the ‘myth of healing’ which re-
searchers o*en use to soothe our worries about the potentially detrimental e-ects 
of the work which we undertake, particularly with vulnerable and/or wounded 
others. Building upon the cornerstone of western psychology, we argue that it 
is not only good for scholarly purposes that those who have endured su-ering 
should talk about it. Yes, it is important to document their experiences — for his-
torical and/or scholarly purposes — but it is also good, we persuade ourselves, for 
them to talk to others (which may or may not include us). )is overly simplistic 
model has come under criticism from a number of di-erent angles, two of which I 
will address here: (1) this misconstrues the boundaries of the scholarly project; (2) 
this con,ates individual pain and the su-ering of the community.
South African oral historian Sean Field has argued that ‘oral historians should 
not cast themselves as ‘healers’ … Oral history will neither heal nor cure but of-
fers subtle support to interviewees’ e-orts to recompose their sense of self and 
regenerate agency” (Field, 2006, p. 31). )ere has been much discussion of the 
potential healing e-ects of giving testimony to the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission (see, for instance, the account of Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, one of the 
commissioners of the TRC, in Van de Merwe & Gobodo-Madikizela, 2007); how-
ever, many of the witnesses who did come before the commission did not have this 
experience, and some even underwent a retraumatisation. However, there is no 
evidence to suggest that the majority of people agreed to give testimony in order to 
unburden themselves. While this may have been a motivation for some, there were 
other concrete and practical reasons to testify, including the perceived possibility 
of reparations for loss, acquiring new information about the fate of absent loved 
ones, and contributing to the larger project of rebuilding the broken nation. Even 
those who were retraumatised by giving testimony did not necessarily regret their 
decision to participate, as their contribution may have achieved other ends, at the 
same time that it caused them anguish.
)e Truth and Reconciliation Commission was not established as a mecha-
nism for providing individual therapy, nor could it perform that function in any 
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systematic way. While some of the rhetoric surrounding the commission implied 
that personal su-ering was likely to decrease as a result of providing testimony, 
indeed this was not part of its mandate. Rather, the Promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act, which established the Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion, refers to the desired goal of the ‘restoration of human and civil dignity’ (cited 
in Field, 2006, p. 32). Critically, the restoration of civil dignity and the promise of 
personal healing are di-erent, and possibly at times con,icting, pursuits. Politi-
cally, the TRC was established as a forum for reconciling the factions of a radically 
divided country. )is was its function. )e healing, if there was to be any, was for 
the country, not for the individual. But this distinction was not always clear. )us, 
while the TRC banner which was in full view for much of the time stated: “)e 
TRC: Healing the Nation” Desmond Tutu voiced a slightly di-erent message at the 
+rst victim hearing:
We pray that all those people who have been injured in either body or spirit may 
receive healing through the work of this commission… We are charged to unearth 
the truth about our dark past. To lay the ghosts of that past, so that they will not 
return to haunt us and that we will hereby contribute to the healing of a trauma-
tized and wounded people. For all of us in South Africa are a wounded people. 
(cited in Field, 2006, p. 32).
)e country needs to be healed, and it requires the participation of its people in or-
der to ‘unearth the truth’ in order to ‘lay the ghosts of the past.’ In Tutu’s statement, 
there is an assumed compatibility between the dual goals of realising individual 
and communal healing.
However, in her work on the Naxalbari movement in Bengal, Srila Roy has ar-
gued that personal pain, when articulated in public testimony, is transformed into 
‘social su-ering’; the individual becomes emblematic of individuals of a kind, and 
the particularities of their story — the aspects which make it their story — are lost.
In the transformation of personal pain into social su-ering, the witness is trans-
posed from one that embodies personal trauma to a metaphor of collective vio-
lence and su-ering……personal pain can be silenced in the transformation into 
collective su-ering. ..the very structure of testimony, as a genre, conditions the 
public articulation of pain in ways that seriously compromise a representation of 
the individual subject in pain. … the act of testimony gives voice to the silence 
of pain in the public domain, it forecloses the possibility of listening to and of 
acknowledging personal pain…. Testimony is, in the +nal instance, a speech act 
that draws its meaning from a collective, plural ‘us’ rather than the ‘I’ who is in 
pain. (Roy, 2006, p. 10)
Roy’s argument, and one which seems to be upheld by many in South Africa, is 
that testifying in public about private pain might ultimately lead to a silencing of 
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the individual su-erer, even at the same time that it might serve to further other, 
desirable ends, such as establishing a common ground of truth for the rebuilding 
of shattered communities.
Jean Améry is one of several well-known writers who survived the Holocaust,1 
only to take his own life years later. Before his death, he recorded feeling little 
comfort from the years which separated him from Auschwitz, Buchenwald and 
Bergen-Belsen, where he had been an inmate: “No remembering has become a 
mere memory… Nothing has healed… Where is it decreed that enlightenment 
must be free of emotion” (cited in Hartman, 1996, p. 137). Time does not heal all 
wounds; indeed, on the contrary, as Lawrence Langer warns “we must learn to 
suspect the e-ect as well as the intent of bracing pieties like ‘redeeming’ and ‘salva-
tion’ when they are used to shape our understanding of the ordeal of former vic-
tims of Nazi oppression’ (Langer, 1991, p. 2). While time and narrative are always 
intricately bound to one another — and if, what and how trauma is narrated will 
be in,uenced in part by the distance of time from the event — time alone neither 
creates nor erases the narrative impulse of trauma survivors.
Life and narrative
Jerome Bruner argues that narrative is the only means we have for describing 
‘lived time’. “[A]rt imitates life… life imitates art. Narrative imitates life, life imi-
tates narrative” (1987, pp. 12–13). Narratives structure our experience, and they 
are the means by which we organize our memories. It has become commonplace 
to say that we are the stories we tell, indeed the stories we live. Our stories are our 
identity, and without them, we lose our compass.
)ere is considerable debate amongst narrative scholars regarding to what ex-
tent narrative is an inherent quality of human experience. Is life, as Roland Barthes 
famously contends, just ‘scrambled messages’ (communications brouillees) (cited 
in Carr, 1986, p. 14)? Or rather, does life itself, in the words of Paul Ricoeur ‘de-
mand narrative’ (1991, p. 29)? Ricoeur argues that there is a ‘pre-narrative quality 
1. Included in this group are such renowned +gures as the Romanian-French poet Paul Celan, 
the Polish writer Tadeusz Borowski, and the Italian writer and chemist Primo Levi (though 
whether or not Levi’s death was accidental is still debated). When Levi heard of Améry’s sui-
cide in 1978, he commented that the latter’s last book on the death camps should be seen as “as 
the bitterest of suicide notes” (Gambetta, 1999,). When Levi’s close friend, Ferdinando Camon, 
heard the news of Levi’s own death (in 1987), he commented “)is suicide must be backdated to 
1945. It did not happen then because Primo wanted (and had to) write. Now, having completed 
his work (!e Drowned and the Saved was the end of the cycle) he could kill himself. And he 
did” (Gambetta, 1999).
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of human experience’, and it is because of this that we can speak of life as ‘a story 
in its nascent form…an activity and a passion in search of a narrative’ (Ricoeur, 
1991, p. 29; italics in the original). But even while narratives might in some sense 
be inherent to the structure of life — in that life is ‘in search of narrative’ — they 
are not and cannot be synonymous with life. And hence the questions persist: By 
structuring our experiences into traditional narrative form, do we lend to them 
a coherence and unity which raw life does not contain? Are narratives ultimately 
products of our own creativity, our human way of lending order to a world which 
is characterized by chaos and disorder? Ricoeur’s response to these pressing issues 
can be summarized in his characterization of narrative as a ‘synthesis of the heter-
ogenous’ (1984, p. 64), whereby concordance and discordance — which lie at the 
heart of narrative and its twin sister time — exist in a dynamic tension with each 
other. )e emplotment of events and incidents into a narrative “ ‘grasps together’ 
and integrates into one whole and complete story multiple and scattered events” 
(Ricoeur, 1984, p. x). )us Ricoeur describes the ‘discordant concordance of nar-
rative and the concordant discordance of time’ (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 32).
When we tell our stories, there is a certain pressure to deliver them within an 
Aristotelian conventional narrative con+guration — one in which concordance 
looms large, where there is a sense of the connection between events, where the 
conclusion is “congruent with the episodes brought together by the story” (Ricoeur, 
1984, p. 67). According to Brockmeier (2008) these stories are “narratives told ac-
cording to the conventions of linearity, continuity, closure, and omniscience… 
[and] are o*en taken as the quasi-natural condition of narrative” (Brockmeier, 
2008, p. 28). Typically, these are stories with beginnings, middles, and endings. As 
historian William Cronon writes:
What distinguishes stories from other forms of discourses is that they describe 
an action that begins, continues over a well-de+ned period of time, and +nally 
draws to a de+nite close, with consequences that become meaningful because of 
their placement within the narrative. Completed action gives a story its unity, and 
allows us to evaluate and judge an act by its results. (1992, p. 1367)
It is precisely this conventional con+guration, this ‘natural condition of narrative’ 
which eludes so many survivors of trauma when they attempt to give an account 
of that which they have endured. )ere is a pressure to provide a certain kind of 
narrative, the story of their lived experience, and this emplotment ‘transforms a 
succession of events into one meaningful whole” (1984, p. 67). But this transfor-
mation is a product of human creation. As Ricoeur describes it: “I see in the plots 
we invent the privileged means by which we re-con+gure our confused, unformed, 
and at the limit mute temporal experience” (1984, p. xi). )e very recon+guration 
of events into a plot “imposes ‘the sense of an ending’ on the inde+nite succession 
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of incidents” (1984, p. 67). Kermode argues that “In ‘making sense’of the world 
we… feel a need to experience that concordance of beginning, middle and end 
which is the essence of our explanatory +ctions…” (Kermode, 1968, pp. 35–36). 
But such +ctions “degenerate” into “myths” whenever we actually believe them or 
ascribe their narrative properties to the real “whenever they are not consciously 
held to be +ctive” (p. 39). How we construct the stories of our lives not only assists 
us in making sense of our lives, but is itself a re,ection of our framework for mak-
ing sense of the world and our place within it. But what happens when no sense 
can be made?
Beginnings of narratives demarcate the point from which all subsequent ac-
tion must follow. But if beginnings are important, endings are even more so. In 
the words of Aristotle, “the end is everywhere the chief thing” (cited in Cronon, 
1992, p. 1367). )e ending of a story is its most crucial component, because it is 
only here that we can appreciate where all the preceding events have been leading. 
As Paul Ricoeur comments, the story’s conclusion is “the pole of attraction of the 
entire development.” (cited in McQuillan, 2000, p. 259), and elsewhere, “the point 
of view from which the story can be perceived as forming a whole” (1984, p. 67). 
Only when we can emplot our experiences (which Ricoeur describes as “an act of 
the productive imagination” (1984, p. 76), can we decipher meaning in the events 
of our lives.
But in order to narrate our experiences, “we force our stories on a world that 
doesn’t +t them” (Cronon, 1992, p. 1367). As Jackson observes:
)e idea that any human life moves serially and progressively from a determinate 
beginning, via a middle passage, towards an ethically or aesthetically satisfying 
conclusion, is as arti+cial as the idea of a river running straightforwardly to the 
sea. Lives and rivers periodically ,ood and run dry; rapids alternate with calm 
stretches, shallows with depths; and there are places where eddies, counter-cur-
rents, undertows, cross-currents, backwaters and dark reaches make navigation 
unpredictable (Jackson, 2002, p. 22).
Life is characterized by an in+nite unfolding of time. )ere is no beginning, mid-
dle or end, just a state of forever continuing. We organize our life and our past 
into structured events precisely because that contains them for us, renders them 
more manageable. We cannot keep a ‘forever continuing’ entity in our heads; it 
surpasses even the great potential of our imagination, and is something which 
we can only dip into once in a while, when we a-ord ourselves the opportunity to 
contemplate the structure of life. But on a daily basis, we do not do this; we cannot 
do this, the task is simply too enormous. And so experience is broken down into 
constituent parts. From this partitioning, we gain the ability to make sense of what 
we are living. But we lose something as well. Although our life can be recounted 
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as a story, there are aspects of our human experience which cannot be contained 
within the boundaries of a conventional narrative structure. )is is particularly so 
in trauma testimony.
Ricoeur devotes a signi+cant amount of attention to considering the narrative 
potential of ‘untold stories’. He comments:
We tell stories because in the last analysis human lives need and merit being nar-
rated. )is remark takes on its full force when we refer to the necessity to save the 
history of the defeated and the lost. )e whole history of su-ering cries out for 
vengeance and calls for narrative. (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 75)
And yet to narrate su-ering can prove impossible for some. Chris Colvin has 
argued that “Stories framed as stories of ‘trauma’ are always already implicated 
in some way in a speci+c perspective on psychological su-ering and recovery” 
(Colvin, 2003, p. 155). )e very set-up of the TRC in which witnesses gave their 
testimony imposed on their narrative a premature closure (an ‘ending’), which, 
however hoped for, was not for them a reality. Colvin provides the example of 
Mbuyiselo Coquorha, who endured torture and multiple forms of deprivation un-
der apartheid. A crucial component of Coquorha’s testimony was his insistence 
that the e-ects of this treatment were ongoing, into the present time. “)is is what 
they have done to me, and I still cannot eat. I am still sick. What will happen to 
me? I ask you, what will become of me?” he asks the commissioners. As Colvin 
comments:
… the historical moment is not, for him, a new one in any tangible way. He still 
su-ers physically and psychologically from his torture. He still lives in poverty 
and fears for his life. He still has not been able to recover from a past (and a pres-
ent) that keeps him too thin, too medicated, too hungry, and too vulnerable. Sto-
rytelling here is not redemptive exercise (Colvin, 2003, pp. 163–164).
Some of those who gave testimony before the TRC participated in other, non-
o.cial, community-based storytelling ventures. Here, the focus was not on the 
therapeutic e-ects of telling trauma. Rather “cra*ing the history of the struggle 
means writing a history about a struggle that is not over. Time has passed but the 
su-ering and the struggling continues” (Colvin, 2003, p. 165). )e bene+t which 
is derived from such communal storytelling is one of bonding. As people listen to 
the stories of others, they can recognise some elements of their own experience. 
)ey know that if and when they come to tell their story, others will, in turn, 
recognise themselves. )is mirroring between self and other functions as connec-
tive tissue between traumatized individuals and their community.
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Narratives and traumatic testimony
Traumatic testimony is marked by what is not there: coherence, structure, mean-
ing, comprehensibility. Edkins has articulated the bind of the trauma survivor for 
whom “it is both impossible to speak, and impossible not to speak” (p. 41). )eir 
stories can only be told in narrative form, and as argued earlier in this paper, that 
very form lends the testimony a framework of meaning which, critically, it lacks. 
Edkins and others have argued that the very conception of time — which lies at 
the heart of narrative construction — is di-erent in the articulation of trauma. 
Edkins distinguishes between ‘trauma time’ and ‘linear time’ — the latter variously 
referred to as narrative time2 — which, she says has “beginnings, middles, and 
ends.” Linear time is central to the workings of the nation state, and even though 
many of us assume that it is ‘real’,
it is a notion that exists because we all work, in and through our everyday prac-
tices, to bring it into being… the production and reproduction of linear time take 
place by people assuming that such a form of times does exist, and speci+cally that 
it exists as an empty, homogenous medium in which events take place. (Edkins, 
2003, pp. xiv–xv)
But not only does trauma time not conform to this construction, but when it is 
forced to do so, something crucial is lost — or, stated di-erently, something fun-
damentally extrinsic is added. One of the most important implications of this re-
scripting of traumatic memory into linear time is that memory is depoliticised 
(Edkins, 2003, p. 52). )e actual emplotment of trauma narratives transforms 
them into something which they are not: experiences which are contained in time, 
indeed which happened in the past and are now +nished (as indicated by their 
‘endings’). Edkins cites the work of Allan Young, who has worked on post-trau-
matic stress disorder: “)e traumatic experience/memory is in a sense timeless. It 
is not transformed into a story, place in time, with a beginning, a middle and an 
end (which is characteristic for narrative memory). If it can be told at all, it is still a 
re-experience” (cited in Edkins, 2003, p. 40). Trauma narratives exist in the forever 
present; in order to capture the heart of experience, individuals must risk another 
journey back to moment of rupture. Hartman describes this as taking a ‘descent 
to the dead.” In trauma testimony, witnesses o*en explicitly speak “for the dead 
or in their name. )is has its dangers: to go down… may be easy, but to come up 
again… that is the hard task” (Hartman, 1996, p. 139).
2. Edkins use of the term ‘narrative time’ is very di-erent from Ricoeur’s theory on the relation 
between time and narrative, to which the latter dedicated three volumes. )e important point 
here, however, is that trauma time is characterised by being imprisoned in a forever present.
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Dominick LaCapra speaks of ‘double inscription of time’ which characterises 
trauma testimony:
one is both back there and here at the same time, and one is able to distinguish 
between (not dichotomize) the two. In other words, one remembers — perhaps 
to some extent still compulsively reliving or being possessed by — what happened 
then without losing a sense of existing and acting now. (LaCapra, 2001, p. 90)
It is perhaps this temporal schizophrenia — both being locked in the past and 
yet knowing that that time is not this time — which makes trauma testimony so 
di.cult to articulate, and why the imposition of a traditional narrative structure 
compromises the attempt to speak the unspeakable.
)e temptation to reshape trauma testimony into a conventional narrative 
con+guration means that we instil in them a wholeness which they do not contain. 
Hayden White has written about the ‘desire for narrative foreclosure’. We urgently 
want and need our narratives to make sense, to be characterised by a logical se-
quencing, and towards this end, we instil in them a wholeness which is not theirs. 
We want, White writes, real events to ‘display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and 
closure of an image of life that is and can only be imaginary” (White, 1987, p. 24).
Evidence for this argument can be found in the transcripts of the Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission. Boc and Mpolweni-Zantsi (2006) have written thought-
fully about the process by which the words of those who gave testimony before the 
TRC became transformed into the transcripts that now appear on the TRC website.
First, a brief word on the role of interpreters in the TRC proceedings. Prior 
to 1994, there were two o.cial languages in South Africa, English and Afrikaans. 
However, in the country’s new constitution, eleven languages were o.cially recog-
nised. Contained within the mandate of the TRC was the stipulation that when 
at all possible, witnesses should be able to speak in their native tongue. Although 
there had never been a professional class of interpreters prior to 1994 — there 
was perceived to be no need for such skills as all were assumed to speak either 
English or Afrikaans — in 1994 all of that changed rather dramatically. Not only 
were interpreters needed, but immediately, and for very intensive work. In the end, 
twenty-three people were trained for ten working days, and it was this group of 
men and women who performed the simultaneous translation for 57,008 hours of 
non-English language testimony into English.
Some of the most memorable images which were ,ashed around the world of 
the proceedings of the TRC were those of interpreters crying as they performed 
their duties.3 It was they who had the impossible job of translating that which 
3. For a discussion on the instantaneous accessibility of images of trauma across the globe, 
see Susan Sontag’s book, Regarding the pain of others. She opens with the statement that “for 
along time some people believed that if the horror could be made vivid enough, most people 
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could not be communicated. In Edkins’ words “What we can say no longer makes 
sense, what we want to say, we can’t. )ere are no words for it. )at is the dilemma 
survivors face” (p. 8). Testi+ers struggle to put their experiences into words, and 
interpreters struggle with putting these o*en ruptured and chaotic expressions 
into another language. As Huston (1999) writes “)ere are some things which 
cannot be translated” (cited in Apfelbaum, 2001, p. 27). )e result was that o*en 
the original testimony was cleaned up, and in some cases information was added. 
A close comparison of the recordings of the hearings with the o.cial transcripts 
of these hearings shows that sometimes the original testimony di-ers signi+cantly 
from its subsequent representation.
An example is where Mrs. Mhlawuli describes the burial of her husband, 
whose hand had been chopped o-. He was buried without this, and in her tes-
timony — translated from the Xhosa into English — she says “We buried him 
without his right wrist — right arm or whatever — hand actually. We don’t know 
what they did with the hand.” )is appeared in the o.cial transcripts as “)ey 
chopped o- his right hand, just below the wrist. I don’t know what they did with 
that hand.” (cited in Boc & Mpolweni-Zantsi, 2006, pp. 107–108). While the testi-
mony has been ‘cleaned up’, it has erased some of the most vital information that 
was contained in the original. Not only does the actual testimony re,ect more 
accurately the emotional rupture experienced by the narrator, but critically, the 
revised version omits the information that Mrs. Mhlawuli’s husband was buried 
without his hand. )is information is culturally signi+cant, as for a Xhosa person 
to be buried without all of their body parts means they cannot rest in peace (Boc 
& Mpolweni-Zantsi, 2006, p. 108).
)ere are other examples where the ‘incoherence’ of an original statement is 
cleaned up, thereby no longer communicating the utter rupture experienced by 
the speaker. In Mrs. Calata’s testimony (cited in Boc & Mpolweni-Zantsi, 2006, 
p. 105), for instance, in which she recounts a story where her children see a picture 
in the newspaper of their father’s friend’s burned out car, the English translation of 
the Xhosa reads: “ If Mathew’s car is burnt what happened to them [her husband 
and his friend]? Hey! No! I became anxious and the situation changed immedi-
ately.” )e o.cial published version of the transcript, however, omits her exclama-
tion of ‘Hey! No!” At this point in the hearings, Mrs. Calata becomes so distressed 
would +nally take in the outrageousness, the insanity of war” (Sontag, 2003, p. 14). Her book is 
an exploration into why this has not happened. While pictures and sounds of war might pour 
into our living rooms daily, the reality does not pierce the skin. Her book concludes with the 
haunting comment: “ ‘We’… don’t understand. We don’t get it. We truly can’t imagine what it was 
like. We can’t imagine how dreadful, how terrifying war is; and how normal it becomes. Can’t 
understand, can’t imagine” (Sontag, 2003, pp. 125–126).
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that Archbishop Tutu decides to adjourn the meeting. However, the deep level of 
anguish, as represented by her self-interruptions and exclamations, are not in evi-
dence in the o.cial transcript. Yet, these very utterances are an important compo-
nent of the testimony, as they contribute to our understanding of how the horri+c 
events being described impacted on the person who is le* behind, struggling to 
create a narrative.
Language and the ‘confusion of tongues’
Paul Ricoeur describes narrative as a “semantic innovation” which opens us to 
“the kingdom of the ‘as if ’ ” (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 64). While narrative might indeed 
enhance our ability to imagine other possibilities, to envision the ‘as if ’, it may be 
de+cient as a tool for capturing the experience of lived human trauma. Elie Wiesel 
describes his feelings of trying to write about the Holocaust: “words seem too in-
conspicuous, worn out, inadequate, anaemic, I wanted them burning. Where can 
one +nd a novel language, a primal language” (cited in Apfelbaum, 2001, p. 26). 
Lawrence Langer makes a similar point: “)e universe of dying that was Aus-
chwitz yearns for a language puri+ed from the taint of normality” (Langer, 1995, 
p. 93).
But how are trauma survivors to +nd such a language? Of course the task 
is impossible. If one is to speak, if one is to o-er witness of the things one has 
known and seen, then one must resort to language, all the while accepting that 
there cannot but be a chasm between ‘that world’ and ‘this.’ Langer (1991) terms 
this ‘a confusion of tongues’, which marks “the clash between the assumptions and 
vocabulary of the present world of the survivor and interviewer and the word-
breaking realities of the concentration camp survivors” (Hartman, 1996, p. 140).
Language is inextricably linked to social structure and power; what words 
mean, how they are used, the blank spaces which exist between and beyond words, 
all of these issues emerge as key considerations in the current discussion. As Ed-
kins writes: “… the language we speak is part of the social order, and when the 
order falls apart around our ears, so does the language” (Edkins, 2003, p. 8).
And yet — and this is important — it is not su.cient to state, as many have, 
that the horrors of the Holocaust (or other ‘limit events’) are simply too terrible for 
words, and therefore must be le* unsaid, and thus unheard. For ultimately, even if 
language is insu.cient for the task, it is, if not all we have, then at least one of the 
most e-ective tools we have for communicating that which must not be forgotten. 
Too o*en we have heard the phrase that those who survive trauma are le* speech-
less; they do not wish to talk about what they have endured, and this remains for-
ever within them as a black hole of su-ering. While this may be true for some (and 
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one must avoid retreating into generalisations about ‘all survivors of trauma’), for 
many others this is simply not the case. Many survivors of trauma emerge from 
these experiences wanting to talk about what they very o*en describe as ‘unsay-
able’ or ‘unimaginable’. Despite the content of what they say, what is crucial is that 
they do say it — that is, if there is someone in place to hear it. As Edkins com-
ments, the terms ‘unsayable’ and ‘unimaginable’ have o*en served as an excuse for 
neither imaging it nor speaking about it” (Edkins, 2003, p. 2). )is is not a su.-
cient moral response. )e claim that those who survived the concentration camps 
were unwilling or unable to talk about their su-ering must be evaluated in light 
of fact that immediately following the war there was a ,urry of testimony which 
was published by those who had been to hell and were crawling their way back. 
However, people did not want to read them. As Wieviorka comments:
Publishers are not philanthropists; they want their books to sell. A successful book 
o*en leads to the publication of other books the same theme. It is the absence of 
this market of buyers and readers — indicating the indi-erence of public opinion 
once the initial shock had passed — which partly explains why the stream of tes-
timonies came to an end. (Wieviorka, 1994, pp. 26–27)
We in the safe outside world told ourselves that the victims of the camps could not 
speak. But many of those who survived tried to speak; when they found they were 
not listened to, they stopped speaking.
One of the most thoughtful treatments of the paradox of language in the con-
text of trauma testimony has been that of Giorgio Agamben. Following Foucault, 
he asks “What happens in the living individual when he occupies the ‘vacant place’ 
of the subject… How can a subject give an account of its own ruin?” (1999, p. 142). 
And yet give an account, the survivor must, all the while recognising that any-
thing that will be said, indeed that can be said, will be an empty container for that 
which has happened. )e signi+cance of such testimony lies not in what is said, 
but simply that something is said. )e fact that the testimony exists, this is what is 
critical. He writes “)e subject of enunciation… maintains itself not in a content 
of meaning but in an event of language” (Agamben, 1999, p. 142). Testimony, he 
tells us, is that which lies
… between the inside and the outside of langue, between the sayable and the 
unsayable in every language — that is, between a potentiality of speech and its 
existence, between a possibility and an impossibility of speech. (Agamben, 1999, 
p. 145)
)e distinction Agamben makes between the content of meaning and the event of 
language is a crucial one. )e content of meaning of much trauma testimony is, in 
fact, that there is a void; those who give witness to trauma, and we who are their 
audience, are, in Maurice Blanchott’s words, “guardians of an absent meaning” 
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(cited in Hartman, 1994, p. 5). But the event of language, the fact of the testimony 
itself, is what is vital, not so much because of the historical information that such 
testimony conveys (though this is important too) but more because of the depths 
of darkness that it begins to make visible to those who were not there, “the psy-
chological and emotional milieu of the struggle for survival, not only then but also 
now” (Hartman, 1996, p. 142).
Agamben describes the paradox confronting those who survive, those who 
can and must give witness:
to bear witness is to place oneself in one’s own language in the position of those 
who have lost it, to establish oneself in a living language as if it were dead, or in a 
dead language as if it were living — in any case, outside both the archive and the 
corpus of what has already been said. (Agamben, 1999, p. 161)
Limit events pose a challenge to narrative, because they lie beyond language, and 
possibly beyond representation. Just as these events demand a new language, so 
too they demand a new method of representation; and yet, we have not prov-
en ourselves equal to the task, despite the fact that more than half a century has 
passed since the end of Second World War. What might this new representation 
look like? And might new forms of narrative be a useful tool in this most challeng-
ing pursuit? )ese are questions which scholars of trauma testimony have been 
grappling with, and to which there are no de+nitive answers. In the words of Saul 
Friedlander, notwithstanding a +*y years’ accumulation of factual knowledge, 
“We have faced surplus meaning or blankness, with little interpretive or represen-
tational advance” (cited in Hartman, 1996, p. 10). )e challenge for future scholars 
remains.
Language and ‘the threshold of silence’
Before one can ask how to represent the Holocaust (and other limit events) one 
must +rst confront the question of whether it is possible to do so — at all. Some of 
the greatest minds of the late 20th century dedicated themselves to this most dif-
+cult question — but ultimately, they did so through words. George Steiner’s work 
on language and silence provides a thoughtful example of this. He acutely describes 
the dilemma that confronts the writer in a world forever scared by genocide:
To a writer who feels that the condition of language is in question, that the world 
may be losing something of its humane genius, two essential courses are available: 
he may seek to render his own idiom representative of general crisis, to convey 
through it the precariousness and vulnerability of the communicative act; or he 
may choose the suicidal rhetoric of silence. (Steiner, 1967, p. 69)
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Many writers resorted to language, all the while struggling with its paucity, its ulti-
mate inability to carry the weight of the historical moment. )e playwright Arthur 
Adamov, exponent of the )eatre of the Absurd, wrote, just before the outbreak of 
the Second World War: ‘Le mots, ces gardiens du sens ne sont pas immortels, in-
vulnerable… Commes les hommes, les mots sou-rent… Certain peuvent suivivre, 
d’autres sont incurables.’ [‘Words, guardians of meaning, are not immortal, invul-
nerable. Like men, words su-er. Some can survive, others are incurable.’] And 
then, with the war, he elaborated on this: “Worn, threadbare, +led down, words 
have become the carcass of words, phantom words; everyone drearily chews and 
regurgitates the sound of them between their jaws” (cited in Steiner, 1967, p. 71).
Jens Brockmeier challenges the view that language is the ‘form and medium 
that represents or transforms experiences into clear and intelligible statements or 
propositions which are communicable and can be re,ected upon” (Brockmeier, 
2002, p. 92). Rather, he argues, “language is itself a reality, a reality that at times can 
be murky, messy, and even ine-able…. [language] outlines — and thus embraces 
— both the sayable and the unsayble” (Brockmeier, 2002, pp. 92–93). It is not the 
choice between language or silence, but rather the relationship between the two 
that has provoked many writers on this subject. Parain comments that ‘language is 
the threshold of silence’, while Lefebvre describes language as ‘at once inside lan-
guage, and on its near and far sides’ (cited in Steiner, 1967, p. 72). Silence always 
and only exists in relation to that which surrounds it. It is the blank spaces between 
words, and as such it helps to frame not only the meaning of what is said but that 
which can be said, a refuge for both the unsaid and the unsayable. As historian 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes:
Not all silences are equal and they cannot be addressed in the same manner; any 
historical narrative [is] a bundle of silences, the result of a unique process, and the 
operation required to deconstruct these silences will vary accordingly (cited in 
Passerini, 2003, p. 249).
Having considered the importance of silence, and its force as a way of marking 
meaning, let us now return to Agamben’s argument, discussed earlier, in which 
he emphasises that what matters is not what is said, but rather that something is 
said. If this is the case, Agamben asks, then “To what does such a language bear 
witness?” His response is powerful:
What cannot be stated, what cannot be archived is the language in which the 
author succeeds in bearing witness to his incapacity to speak… Just as in the 
starry sky that we see at night, the stars shine surrounded by a total darkness 
that, according to cosmologists, is nothing other than the testimony of a time 
in which the stars did not shine, so the speech of the witness bears witness to a 
time in which human beings did not yet speak; and so the testimony of human 
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beings attests to a time in which they were not yet human. (Agamben, 1999, 
pp. 161–162)
Traumatic testimony bears witness to a total darkness. Although it o*en is incom-
prehensible and incoherent, its signi+cance is that it functions to mark the void.
Dominick LaCapra (1996, 1998), amongst others, has written about the crisis 
of representation posed by the Shoah, a crisis which pertains to the problem of his-
torical understanding. How can such limit events be represented at all? Hartman 
argues that “there are no limits to representation, only limits to conceptualization, 
to the intelligibility of the Shoah” (Hartman, 1996, p. 28). )e limits are not what 
can be represented, so much as what can be thought. Simply “we do not believe 
that what we are made to feel and see is part of reality” (p. 28), and with this, then, 
there follows a most indicting corollary: “… the problem of limits … is not so much 
the +niteness of intellect as the +niteness of human empathy that comes into view” 
(Hartman, 1996, p. 129). Hartman describes a representational rupture which ‘in-
volves story as well as history: the story of hell, of its representations. Before Aus-
chwitz we were children in our imagination of evil; a*er Auschwitz we are no lon-
ger children”. Citing Des Pres, he describes “a new shape of knowing which invades 
the mind”, concluding that “we have changed as knowers” (Hartman 1996, p. 130).
Erika Apfelbaum speaks of the ‘profound dilemma’ which confronts those 
who are presented with stories of trauma. We respond with a ‘stubborn deafness’ 
for to do otherwise is to put ourselves, and the moral universe in which we oper-
ate, at risk. Apfelbaum elaborates on ‘the threatening implications of listening’:
It requires a willingness to follow the teller into a world of radical otherness and 
to accept the frightening implications it carries for our personal lives and society 
as a whole. )e only way to truly hear is to acknowledge the unbridgeable gap be-
tween the two worlds, and to assimilate the impact of this unbridgeable di-erence. 
Understanding is irrelevant (the reality always exceeds what the narrative is able 
to represent and convey). What is important is the willingness to become part of 
the transmission. (Apfelbaum, 2001, p. 31)
Brockmeier’s work with twenty-six written personal narratives provided by eye-
witnesses of the attacks on the World Trade Center — collected as part of “)e 
9/11 National Memory Survey on the Terroist Attacks” — deals with the problem 
of how people talk about elusive experiences. )ese accounts, Brockmeier summa-
rizes, speak to “the experience of the limits… not only… of language but also the 
limits of experience itself ” (Brockmeier, 2008, p. 29). Echoing the work of Hart-
man, LaCapra, and others who have written on the crisis of representation (in rela-
tion to the Holocaust), Brockmeier’s work on the Twin Towers testimony provides 
evidence for the claim that at the core of traumatic experience is “its failure to 
be represented in any common forms or modes or representation” (Brockmeier, 
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2008, p. 29). Brockmeier then describes work with “antirealist, experimental, and 
formally innovative types of narrative” which he characterizes as “non-Aristotelian 
forms of broken narrative [which] do not claim to represent the original trauma” 
(Brockmeier, 2008, p. 29). While these non-traditional narrative forms might hold 
more promise for “communicating with others about events that demand witness 
but defy narrative expression” (Apfelbaum, 2001, p. 20) Brockmeier concludes by 
describing traumatic experience as
…a break not just with a particular form of representation but with the very pos-
sibility of representation at all… )e traumatic gap between language and experi-
ence does not just re,ect a rupture with the way the world is depicted but with 
the existential basics of human meaning making. (Brockmeier, 2008, pp. 33–34)
,e search for heroic meanings
)is poses a key challenge for those who listen to traumatic testimony. Because 
we believe in the power of stories, and because we are creatures who are forever 
engaged in creating and deciphering meaning in our world, we cannot accept what 
we are told time and time again: )ere is no meaning in these stories. )ere are no 
heroes. )ere are no lessons. All of this su-ering did not resolve itself in a better 
world. And yet if we cannot accept this — and there is much evidence that we do 
not — then we have not even learned the very +rst lesson about listening to trau-
ma. For ourselves, we want these painful narratives to signify something, and we 
recreate those who o-er their testimony in another image, one which e-ectively 
makes further telling more di.cult. )ose who emerge from the ruins cannot be 
who we want them to be, who we need them to be. We persist in our e-orts none-
theless, as too much is at stake.
Lawrence Langer tells the story of Magda F., who survived the Holocaust 
though her husband, parents, brother, three sisters and all their children did not. 
Another brother and sister had emigrated to the United States in the 1920s, where 
she joined them at the end of the war. )ey wanted to hear from her what had hap-
pened, and yet she found herself painfully unable to communicate anything which 
they could understand. ‘nobody, but nobody fully understands us. You can’t. No 
[matter] how much sympathy you give me when I’m talking here.” She says that 
she hopes they will never be able to understand “because to understand, you have 
to go through with it, and I hope nobody in the world comes to this again, [so] 
that they should understand us. … nobody, nobody, nobody…” (cited in Langer, 
1991, p. xiv). Here her testimony breaks o-. Magda’s e-orts to communicate what 
she has seen are persistent, even while she believes that these attempts will always 
be thwarted by the limitations to imagine that of which we have no experience.
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Geo-rey Hartman writes poignantly about our inability to listen to the void
… we who were not there always look for something the survivors cannot o-er us. 
… it is our search for meaning which is disclosed, as if we had to be comforted for 
what they su-ered …. If we learn anything here it is about life when the search for 
meaning had to be suspended: we are made to focus on what it was like to exist 
under conditions in which moral choice was systematically disabled by the perse-
cutors and heroism was rarely possible. (Hartman, 1994, pp. 133–134)
As the founder of the Fortunu- Video Archive for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale 
University, Hartman knows of what he speaks. Having overseen the collection of 
over 4000 testimonies of Holocaust survivors, Hartman warns against the ‘search 
for heroic meanings’ in which interviewers over-identify with the witness. )is 
inclination is, he says, ‘far from innocent’ as it e-ectively eradicates the message 
of the narratives, at the same time that it strips witnesses of their agency. Rather 
than experiencing any kind of empowerment from giving testimony, witnesses 
are instead con+ned by we their listeners to perpetual victimhood. Removing the 
weight of the heroic genre, space is created for a di-erent kind of narrative, one 
which documents the pain of speaking the unspeakable.
…the strength required to face a past like that radiates visibly o- the screen and 
becomes a vital fact…breaking the silence is, for those who endured so dehuman-
izing an assault, an a.rmative step, in part because of their very willingness to use 
ordinary words whose adequacy and inadequacy must both be respected. (Hart-
man 1996, pp. 142–143, 145)
Concluding comments
In this article, I have explored some di.culties associated with telling and listen-
ing to traumatic testimony. My own entry into this discussion is as one who is 
interested in political narratives, how the very stories which individuals tell about 
their own lives function as a point for viewing the wider social context. Personal 
narratives have the potential to act as a bridge between private and public worlds. 
In the case of trauma testimony, this is perhaps the most one can hope for. )ere 
may be no promise that telling leads to healing, but very act of speech — no matter 
how garbled or seemingly nonsensical — can begin the process of reconnecting 
one to the world of the living. Hannah Arendt has written that
A life without speech and without action… is literally dead to the world; it has 
ceased to be a human life because it is no longer lived among men. With word 
and deed we insert ourselves into the human world, and this insertion is like a 
second birth, in which we con+rm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our 
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original physical appearance…. [)e impulse to do this] springs from the begin-
ning which came into the world when we were born and to which we respond by 
beginning something new on our own initiative. (Arendt 1958, pp. 176–177)
Traumatic testimonies might not provide listeners with a beginning, middle, and 
end, but they have the potential to assist individuals to “move beyond the self into 
what Buber calls the essential-we relationship, so opening oneself up to the stories 
of others and thereby seeing that one is not alone in one’s pain” (Jackson, 2006, 
p. 59). And here lies the potential gi* of narrative: the knowledge that we are not 
alone. As Lacan reminds us ‘What I seek in speech is the response of the Other… 
)ere is no speech without a reply, even if it is only met with silence’ (Lacan, 1995, 
p. 40, 86).
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